New Delhi: Expert analyses of the April 4, 2025, meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bangladesh’s interim Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus on the sidelines of the BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok reflect a range of perspectives, shaped by the complex dynamics of India-Bangladesh relations. The meeting, the first since Yunus assumed leadership of Bangladesh’s interim government following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in August 2024, has been interpreted as a pragmatic step amid strained bilateral ties, though opinions differ on its implications and outcomes.
Many experts view the meeting as a cautious move by India to engage with Yunus’ administration without signaling full endorsement. The backdrop of tensions—stemming from attacks on minorities in Bangladesh, Yunus’ comments on India’s northeastern states during his China visit, and Dhaka’s push for Hasina’s extradition—frames this as a diplomatic balancing act. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s briefing highlighted Modi’s emphasis on a “democratic, stable, peaceful, progressive, and inclusive Bangladesh,” alongside concerns over minority safety and border security. Analysts see this as India setting clear expectations rather than offering unconditional support. A professor of International Relations at Dhaka University, Lailufar Yasmin, suggested that India might not yet view this as a normalization of relations but rather as a way to keep channels open while monitoring Yunus’ actions closely.
Some interpret the meeting as a response to regional geopolitics, particularly Yunus’ recent overtures to China. His remarks in Beijing about Bangladesh being the “only guardian of the ocean” for India’s landlocked northeast sparked criticism in India, with leaders like Assam’s Chief Minister calling them provocative. Experts like Ali Ashraf, another academic, argue that Yunus’ China visit may have prompted India to act, lest Bangladesh drift further into Beijing’s orbit. The absence of China in BIMSTEC, they note, provided a comfortable setting for India to reassert influence without direct confrontation. However, this is tempered by skepticism: one analyst remarked that India’s decision to meet now, after rebuffing earlier requests (e.g., at the UN General Assembly), might reflect a reluctant acknowledgment of Yunus’ staying power rather than a strategic win.
Others see it as a small, symbolic step unlikely to resolve deeper issues immediately. The Business Standard quoted experts cautioning that while the meeting is positive, it’s not a turning point. India remains wary of Yunus’ unelected regime, the rise of Islamist elements, and the lack of a clear election timeline. Modi’s call to avoid “rhetoric that vitiates the environment” was widely read as a pointed reference to Yunus’ northeast comments, signaling that trust-building will be slow. Bangladeshi officials, like Khalilur Rahman, framed it as “constructive,” with Yunus raising Hasina’s extradition and the Ganga water treaty, but Indian hesitance on these fronts suggests limited concessions.
Critics, including some Indian commentators, question the timing and optics. Posts on X and opinions from figures like Swapan Dasgupta reflect unease that meeting Yunus legitimizes a “fragile regime” that has been anti-India in tone. They argue it’s a diplomatic climb-down from India’s earlier stance of limiting engagement to lower levels. Conversely, optimists point to Modi’s broader BIMSTEC agenda—promoting connectivity through India’s northeast—as a sign that India is playing a long game, using the meeting to reinforce regional cooperation over bilateral friction.
In summary, experts read the Modi-Yunus meeting as a pragmatic, low-risk engagement driven by regional dynamics and mutual necessity. It’s seen as a platform for India to voice concerns—especially on minorities and security—while testing Yunus’ intentions, rather than a breakthrough in resetting ties. The consensus leans toward cautious optimism, with the caveat that significant progress hinges on Bangladesh addressing India’s strategic and domestic concerns.
